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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 David N. Burggraf challenges the district court’s orders denying his Rule 35 
motion and awarding restitution to his former wife, Ashley Burggraf.1  The court ordered 
$500 in restitution to Ms. Burggraf to reimburse her for the insurance deductible 
withheld by the insurance company when it paid her for the value of the car that 
Mr. Burggraf crashed when committing this crime.  Because that car was community 
property, the marital estate suffered the economic loss and the restitution award should 
have gone to the marital estate.  In response, the State argues that the court properly 
awarded restitution because it was necessary to make Ms. Burggraf whole and because 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206 (Ct. App. 2012), rejected the 
notion that losses should be apportioned when the defendant and victim jointly owned 
the property that is the subject of restitution.  This reply addresses the shortcomings in 
the State’s arguments.    
 
 
                                            
1 This reply addresses only the restitution issue.   
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ISSUES 
 
I.   Did the district court abuse its discretion by awarding $500 in restitution to 
Ms. Burggraf because the car Mr. Burggraf crashed was community property?  
 
II.   Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Burggraf’s Rule 35 
motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Awarding $500 In Restitution To 
Ms. Burggraf Because The Car Mr. Burggraf Crashed Was Community Property 
 
 Mr. Burggraf argued in his opening brief that the district court abused its 
discretion by awarding $500 in restitution to Ms. Burggraf because it was the marital 
community, not Ms. Burggraf individually, that suffered the economic loss and thus was 
the victim of the crime.  (App. Br., pp.7–9.)  In response, the State first claims: 
The total loss to Ashley Burggraf was, as the insurance company 
determined, $5,741.28.  (Def. Ex. A.)  However, the insurance company 
paid Ashley $5,241.28—which is $500 less than the amount needed to 
make her whole.  (Def. Ex. B.)  Although the $500 shortfall was the result 
of the deductible payment being subtracted from the insurance payment, 
because [Mr.] Burggraf’s criminal conduct caused that loss to Ashley, he is 
responsible for making her whole just as if he were unrelated to her. 
 
(Resp. Br., pp.7–8.)   
The State’s argument has missed the point.  The car was community property.  
(See generally 5/27/14 Tr.2)  As a result, Ms. Burggraf did not need a total of $5,741.28 
to make her whole, and she did not suffer a $500 loss after having received the 
$5,241.28 check from the insurance company (which the State fails to note was made 
out to both Ms. and Mr. Burggraf).  It was the marital estate that suffered the loss, as the 
$500 deductible was taken directly from the value of the car belonging to the marital 
estate.  See Def. Exs. A, B; C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 517–
18 (1976) (McQuade, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that “the ‘owner’ of community real 
property is neither the husband alone nor the wife; but rather both the husband and 
                                            
2 Defense counsel repeatedly stated that the car was community property, and the State 
never objected.  Mr. Burggraf thus contends that the State has conceded that the car 
was community property and similarly failed to prove that Ms. Burggraf suffered an 
economic loss.  (See App. Br., pp.8–9.) 
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wife”) (citing Anderson v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass’n, 77 Idaho 373, 377 (1956)); see also 
AMY MORRIS HESS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 26 (2014) (“Each spouse has 
an undivided one-half interest in all [community] property.”).  As such, the State is 
incorrect when it claims that Ms. Burggraf needed $500 in restitution to make her whole. 
Ms. Burggraf individually suffered no economic loss, and thus was not a victim entitling 
her to restitution.  See I.C. §§ 19–5304(1)(e)(i), (2).      
To be clear, Mr. Burggraf has not argued that he should pay no restitution.  Nor 
has he argued that Ms. Burggraf has no right to any of the $500 deductible—he in fact 
acknowledges that she has a “vested, equal and undivided ownership interest” in their 
community property.  C. Forsman Real Estate Co., 97 Idaho at 517–18 (McQuade, C.J., 
dissenting).  He only contends that Ms. Burggraf is not a victim under the plain language 
of I.C. § 19–5304 because she did not individually suffer an economic loss.   
The State also takes issue with the divorce-related documents Mr. Burggraf 
provided to this Court in Appendix A to the Appellant’s Brief.  (Resp. Br., p.6, n.5.)  
Mr. Burggraf acknowledges that those documents are not necessary for this Court to 
decide this appeal.  He provided them to the Court, however, to give a complete picture 
of this issue.  (App. Br., p.1 n.1.)  Instead of making the initial determination of whether 
the car was community property—a prerequisite to deciding whether Ms. Burggraf 
suffered economic loss and was thus a victim—district court mistakenly deferred to the 
divorce court to sort out the issue.  (5/27/14 Tr., p.17, L.20 – p.21, L.9; App. Br., pp.4–
5.)  The divorce court in turn found:  “As to the insurance proceeds from the Suburban.  
The Court finds that those have already been dealt with in the Freemont County case by 
Judge Moeller to the extent necessary.” (See Appendix A, Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law, p.3.)  But the district court in this case did not make any 
determination regarding the insurance proceeds.  (5/27/14 Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.21, L.9.)  It 
only determined that the deductible should be awarded to Ms. Burggraf as restitution.  
(Amended Order for Restitution, attached to June 12, 2015 letter from Becky 
Harrigfeld). The net result is that Ms. Burggraf has received the full value of the family 
car, even though the car was community property.   
 The State next cites to State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206 (Ct. App. 2012), to argue that 
Mr. Burggraf “should not be able to apportion Ashley’s loss for the damage he inflicted 
on the marital community.”  (Resp. Br., p.11.)  The State’s reliance on Hill is misplaced.  
Although Hill raises an issue similar to the one here, the parties framed it in a very 
different way.  The defendant in Hill was one of three members in a limited liability 
company.  Hill, 154 Idaho at 208.  After he was convicted of grand theft for 
misappropriating $290,768.29 of the LLC’s funds, the district court awarded 
$290,768.29 in restitution, to be split between the two remaining members of the LLC.  
Id. at 211.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the defendant’s claim that the court 
should have awarded only two-thirds of the total amount of losses in restitution to the 
other two members of the LLC because the three men each shared an interest in the 
LLC.  Id. at 212–13.   
 Here, on the other hand, Mr. Burggraf has not argued that the court should have 
awarded only half of the $500 deductible to Ms. Burggraf because they shared an 
interest in the car.  Instead, he has explained that because the car belonged to the 
marital estate, Ms. Burggraf did not individually suffer an economic loss and thus was 
not a victim under I.C. § 19–5304(1)(e)(i), (2).  Therefore, the restitution award should 
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have gone to the marital estate, the entity which actually suffered the loss.  Because the 
Hill decision did not address that argument, Hill does not control.   
Further, considering that the individual LLC members in Hill were similarly not 
victims per I.C. § 19–5304(1)(e)(i), Hill was incorrectly decided.  See I.C. § 30–25–
108(1) (“A limited liability company is an entity distinct from its member or members.”).  
Because the defendant there misappropriated funds from the LLC, it was the LLC (not 
the individual members) that suffered the economic loss.  See Hill, 154 Idaho at 208.  
The Court should have awarded restitution to the LLC, not the two other members of the 
LLC in their individual capacities.  See I.C. § 19–5304(1)(e)(i), (2).  
The district abused its discretion by declining to decide whether the car was 
community property, and abused its discretion by awarding the $500 insurance 
deductible to Ms. Burggraf because she did not individually suffer the economic loss 
and thus was not a victim under the restitution statutes. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Burggraf respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s $500 
restitution award to Ms. Burggraf.  He also requests that the Court reduce his fixed 
sentence to two years, with eight years indeterminate, to run concurrently to his other 
case. 
 DATED this 19th day of January, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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